AWS Certified Security — Specialty (SCS-C03)
A documentation-first study guide. AWS writes the exam from its own documentation, so reading the docs is the highest-leverage thing you can do. This guide is a curated index into the canonical references, FAQs, and a selection of whitepapers — organised around the six exam domains, not around services.
Maps to the published AWS Certified Security — Specialty (SCS-C03) exam guide (v1.0). Domain weights and task/skill statements are quoted from that PDF.
About the exam
Current exam code: SCS-C03 (available since December 2, 2025; exam guide v1.0). It replaced SCS-C02, whose last sitting was December 1, 2025. The revision restructured the old "Threat Detection and Incident Response" and "Security Logging and Monitoring" domains into separate Detection and Incident Response domains, raised Identity and Access Management from 16% to 20%, and added new content: generative AI application guardrails, Amazon Security Lake and OCSF, AWS Verified Access, Amazon Verified Permissions, IAM Roles Anywhere, resource control policies (RCPs), and sensitive-data masking.
What changed from SCS-C02 (per Appendix B of the exam guide):
- Old Domains 1 and 2 were split differently: Detection (monitoring + logging) is now one domain, Incident Response another.
- IAM rose from 16% to 20%; Infrastructure Security fell from 20% to 18%; Domain 6 was renamed Security Foundations and Governance.
- Added: generative AI guardrails (Skill 3.2.7), OCSF and third-party edge integrations, inter-resource encryption in transit, imported vs AWS-generated key material, sensitive-data masking, and multi-Region key and certificate management.
- Removed: the standalone cost-analysis task, host-based firewalls, TCP/IP fundamentals, and VIF-based cross-Region networking.
Format: 65 questions (50 scored + 15 unscored) · 170 minutes · $300 USD · scaled score 100–1,000, pass at 750. Compensatory scoring — you need to pass the exam overall, not each domain. SCS-C03 adds two question types beyond multiple choice and multiple response: ordering (place 3–5 steps in sequence) and matching (pair responses with 3–7 prompts) — partial credit is not given, so incident-response sequences and encryption workflows are worth rehearsing step by step.
The six domains:
- Domain 1 — Detection — 16%
- Domain 2 — Incident Response — 14%
- Domain 3 — Infrastructure Security — 18%
- Domain 4 — Identity and Access Management — 20%
- Domain 5 — Data Protection — 18%
- Domain 6 — Security Foundations and Governance — 14%
Primary official sources (bookmark these):
- Official Security — Specialty certification page
- SCS-C03 Exam Guide (PDF)
- SCS-C03 exam guide (HTML, on docs.aws.amazon.com)
- AWS Skill Builder — free exam prep course and the official practice question set
Whitepapers worth reviewing:
- AWS Security Incident Response Guide — the vocabulary of Domain 2 comes from here.
- Security Pillar — AWS Well-Architected Framework — the mental model the whole exam is written against.
- AWS Key Management Service Best Practices — key policies, grants, and rotation patterns for Domain 5.
- AWS Best Practices for DDoS Resiliency — the edge-security layering that Domain 3 tests.
- Organizing Your AWS Environment Using Multiple Accounts — multi-account strategy for Domain 6.
- AWS Security Reference Architecture — how AWS itself recommends deploying the security services across an organization.
Priority tiers: The published domain weights (16/14/18/20/18/14) tell you how the exam is balanced across the six domains, but they don't tell you that within each domain a handful of services account for most of the questions. Every section in this guide carries a tier badge based on triangulating the AWS exam guide, the experience reports of recent test takers, and the patterns that appear in the practice-exam community:
- ★★★ Core Heavily tested. Multiple questions will lean on this. Spend hours, not minutes — if you don't know it well, you fail.
- ★★ Important Reliably tested, usually one or two questions. Read every linked page in the section, do the FAQ, understand the comparison points. A few hours per topic.
- ★ Light Known to appear, but typically as one distinguishing question or as wrong-answer distractors. Skim the docs, learn the one-line distinction, move on. Twenty minutes to an hour.
For an 8–12 week prep cycle the rough split that the data supports is about 60% of your time on Core topics, 30% on Important, and 10% on Light. The biggest single concentration of questions across the whole exam is the cluster around IAM policy evaluation + KMS key policies and grants + S3 data protection + GuardDuty/Security Hub + CloudTrail/AWS Config + VPC network controls + Organizations SCPs and RCPs — know those cold and you have the foundation of a pass. This is a specialty exam: questions are long, scenario-based, and usually offer four answers that would all technically work — you are picking the one that is most secure, most automated, or least operationally expensive.
Exam-day tactics:
- 170 minutes for 65 questions is about 2.5 minutes each; long scenarios reward reading the final sentence (the actual question) first.
- Most questions map a requirement keyword to a service: "immutable" → Object Lock, "single-tenant HSM" → CloudHSM, "without a VPN" → Verified Access, "organization-wide guardrail" → SCP/RCP.
- Ordering questions give no partial credit — rehearse the incident-response and encryption-migration sequences until the order is automatic.
- Flag and move on; unanswered questions score zero, so answer everything.
How to use this guide:
- Each section opens with a one-paragraph summary explaining what to focus on, then has up to three link sections: Core docs (user/developer guides — the canonical reference), FAQ (exam writers love edge cases from FAQs — do not skip), and Deeper reading (whitepapers, blog posts, prescriptive guidance).
- If a link 404s, AWS has reorganised the docs. Search the page title to find the new location — the content almost always still exists.
- The What's New feed is worth a weekly scan in the last month before your exam; the exam lags new features by ~12 months but recent launches are a good prompt to revisit older chapters.
Part I — Domain 1: Detection (16%)
Detection now stands on its own: monitoring and alerting, logging pipelines, and the troubleshooting of both. You cannot secure what you cannot see — CloudTrail, VPC Flow Logs, and CloudWatch are the spine; Security Hub and GuardDuty are the brains; Security Lake is the new data lake layer.
Chapter 1 — Monitoring and alerting
Maps to Task 1.1 — Design and implement monitoring and alerting solutions for an AWS account or organization
Skills:
- Skill 1.1.1: Analyze workloads to determine monitoring requirements.
- Skill 1.1.2: Design and implement workload monitoring strategies (for example, by configuring resource health checks).
- Skill 1.1.3: Aggregate security and monitoring events.
- Skill 1.1.4: Create metrics, alerts, and dashboards to detect anomalous data and events (for example, Amazon GuardDuty, Amazon Security Lake, AWS Security Hub, Amazon Macie).
- Skill 1.1.5: Create and manage automations to perform regular assessments and investigations (for example, by deploying AWS Config conformance packs, Security Hub, AWS Systems Manager State Manager).
1.1 AWS Security Hub ★★★ Core
Security Hub is the central pane of glass for the whole exam. Know that it aggregates findings from GuardDuty, Inspector, Macie, IAM Access Analyzer, AWS Config, and partners; runs security standards (AWS Foundational Security Best Practices, CIS); supports cross-Region aggregation and delegated administration; and drives automation through EventBridge (all findings automatically), automation rules (on ingest), and custom actions (analyst-triggered). Expect 3-5 questions.
Core docs
- What is AWS Security Hub? — aggregation, standards, and automation overview
- Security standards and controls — AWS Foundational Security Best Practices, CIS, PCI DSS
- Understanding the AWS Security Finding Format — normalized finding fields, severity, workflow status
- Insights in Security Hub — grouped finding collections; custom insights for regular audits
- Automation rules — modify or suppress findings automatically on ingest
- Automated response and remediation with EventBridge — all findings stream to EventBridge; custom actions for on-demand response
- Cross-Region aggregation — designate an aggregation Region
- Managing administrator and member accounts — delegated administrator via Organizations
FAQ
1.2 Amazon GuardDuty ★★★ Core
GuardDuty remains the most heavily tested detection service. Know its foundational data sources (CloudTrail management and S3 data events, VPC Flow Logs, DNS query logs — consumed directly, no need to enable them yourself), the protection plans (S3, EKS, Malware Protection, RDS, Lambda, Runtime Monitoring — runtime monitoring of compute is called out in Task 3.2.3), finding types by resource, suppression rules vs trusted IP lists vs threat lists, and multi-account setup with a delegated administrator. Expect 3-5 questions.
Core docs
- What is Amazon GuardDuty? — continuous threat detection from CloudTrail, VPC Flow Logs, DNS logs
- GuardDuty foundational data sources — why GuardDuty works even if you never enabled flow logs
- Finding types — the taxonomy: ThreatPurpose:ResourceType/ThreatFamilyName
- Runtime Monitoring — agent-based runtime threat detection for EC2, ECS/Fargate, EKS
- Malware Protection — agentless EBS snapshot scanning on suspicious behaviour
- S3 Protection — monitors S3 data-plane activity via data events
- Suppression rules — auto-archive expected findings without disabling detection
- Trusted IP lists and threat lists — trusted IPs never generate findings; threat lists always do
- Managing multiple accounts — Organizations integration and delegated administrator
FAQ
1.3 Amazon CloudWatch for security monitoring ★★★ Core
The classic exam pattern survives into C03: CloudTrail delivers to a CloudWatch Logs log group, a metric filter matches a pattern (console sign-in without MFA, root account usage, security group changes), the filter feeds a metric, an alarm on the metric notifies an SNS topic. Know metric filters vs subscription filters (filters to metrics vs streaming log events to Lambda/Kinesis), alarm states including INSUFFICIENT_DATA, resource health checks, and CloudWatch Logs encryption with KMS. Expect 3-4 questions.
Core docs
- What is Amazon CloudWatch? — metrics, alarms, dashboards
- What is Amazon CloudWatch Logs? — log groups, streams, retention settings
- Creating metrics from log events using filters — metric filters for security patterns
- Real-time processing with subscription filters — stream log events to Lambda, Kinesis, Firehose
- Using Amazon CloudWatch alarms — thresholds, evaluation periods, SNS actions
- Encrypt log data with AWS KMS — key policy must grant the logs service principal
- Route 53 health checks — resource health checks as a monitoring signal
- Using dashboards — visualizing anomalies across accounts and Regions
FAQ
1.4 Amazon Macie ★★ Important
Macie discovers sensitive data (PII, credentials, financial data) in S3 using managed and custom data identifiers, and separately evaluates bucket-level security posture (public access, encryption, sharing outside the organization). Know sensitive data discovery jobs vs automated discovery, and that findings flow to Security Hub and EventBridge. The classic scenario: "identify which buckets contain PII before a compliance audit". Expect 1-2 questions.
Core docs
- What is Amazon Macie? — sensitive data discovery for S3
- Discovering sensitive data — one-time and scheduled classification jobs
- Managed data identifiers — built-in detection for PII, credentials, financial data
- Custom data identifiers — regex-based detection for proprietary data
- Monitoring S3 security posture — bucket inventory, public access and encryption evaluation
- Types of Macie findings — policy findings vs sensitive data findings
FAQ
1.5 Automated assessments and event aggregation ★★ Important
Skill 1.1.5 names the regular-assessment toolkit: AWS Config conformance packs deploy rule bundles org-wide, Security Hub standards re-evaluate controls continuously, Systems Manager State Manager re-applies desired configuration on a schedule, and EventBridge is the routing backbone that aggregates findings and events into automation. Know which tool answers "assess on a schedule" (Config/State Manager) vs "react to an event" (EventBridge). Expect 1-2 questions.
Core docs
- Conformance packs — deployable packs of Config rules and remediations
- AWS Systems Manager State Manager — enforce desired configuration continuously
- Insights in Security Hub — saved groupings as recurring audit views
- Amazon SNS — the notification endpoint in almost every alerting answer
1.6 Amazon EventBridge for security automation ★★★ Core
EventBridge is the glue in nearly every Domain 1/2 automation answer. Know event patterns for GuardDuty, Security Hub, Config, and Macie findings; scheduled rules; dead-letter queues and retry behaviour for targets; and cross-account event buses (with resource-based policies) for centralizing security events into one account. When an automation "never ran", check the rule pattern against the actual event structure and the target's resource policy. Expect 2-3 questions, usually embedded in remediation scenarios.
Core docs
- What is Amazon EventBridge? — event buses, rules, targets
- Amazon EventBridge event patterns — matching on finding type, severity, resource
- Amazon EventBridge targets — Lambda, Step Functions, SSM Automation, SNS
- Sending and receiving events between event buses — centralize security events cross-account
- Automated response and remediation with EventBridge — Security Hub findings as the event source
- SNS access control — topic policies; why a service cannot publish without them
FAQ
Chapter 2 — Logging solutions
Maps to Task 1.2 — Design and implement logging solutions
Skills:
- Skill 1.2.1: Identify sources for log ingestion and storage based on requirements.
- Skill 1.2.2: Configure logging for AWS services and applications (for example, by configuring an AWS CloudTrail trail for an organization, by creating a dedicated Amazon CloudWatch logging account, by configuring the Amazon CloudWatch Logs agent).
- Skill 1.2.3: Implement log storage and log data lakes (for example, Security Lake) and integrate with third-party security tools.
- Skill 1.2.4: Use AWS services to analyze logs (for example, CloudWatch Logs Insights, Amazon Athena, Security Hub findings).
- Skill 1.2.5: Use AWS services to normalize, parse, and correlate logs (for example, Amazon OpenSearch Service, AWS Lambda, Amazon Managed Grafana).
- Skill 1.2.6: Determine and configure appropriate log sources based on network design, threats, and attacks (for example, VPC Flow Logs, transit gateway flow logs, Amazon Route 53 Resolver logs).
2.1 AWS CloudTrail ★★★ Core
CloudTrail is the most tested logging service on the exam. Know management events vs data events (S3 object-level, Lambda invoke — extra cost, off by default) vs Insights events; organization trails (one trail, all member accounts, members cannot modify it); log file integrity validation with SHA-256 digest files; delivery to S3 (bucket policy must allow cloudtrail.amazonaws.com) and optionally CloudWatch Logs; SSE-KMS encryption of trail logs; and CloudTrail Lake for SQL queries over an immutable event data store. Expect 3-5 questions.
Core docs
- What is AWS CloudTrail? — API audit logging for the account
- Logging management events — control-plane calls; delivered by default on a trail
- Logging data events — S3 object-level and Lambda invoke logging
- Logging Insights events — anomaly detection on API call rates and error rates
- Creating a trail for an organization — the org-wide logging pattern named in Skill 1.2.2
- Validating CloudTrail log file integrity — digest files prove logs were not tampered with
- Amazon S3 bucket policy for CloudTrail — the number-one cause of "logs stopped delivering"
- Encrypting CloudTrail log files with AWS KMS keys — SSE-KMS and the required key policy statements
- Working with AWS CloudTrail Lake — SQL queries over an immutable event data store
- CloudTrail log event reference — userIdentity, sourceIPAddress, errorCode fields you must be able to read
FAQ
2.2 Network log sources ★★★ Core
Skill 1.2.6 names the network telemetry menu. VPC Flow Logs: 5-tuple metadata with ACCEPT/REJECT at VPC, subnet, or ENI level, delivered to CloudWatch Logs, S3, or Firehose — no payloads, no DNS-to-AmazonProvidedDNS, no metadata traffic. Transit gateway flow logs extend the same telemetry to inter-VPC and hybrid traffic. Route 53 Resolver query logs capture DNS lookups from VPCs (including to malicious domains). The REJECT record is the exam's favourite way to say "a security group or NACL blocked this". Expect 2-3 questions.
Core docs
- Logging IP traffic using VPC Flow Logs — capture points, destinations, limitations
- Flow log records — default and custom field reference
- Publish flow logs to Amazon S3 — bucket policy requirements for delivery
- Transit gateway flow logs — telemetry for hub-and-spoke traffic
- Route 53 Resolver query logging — DNS queries from VPCs
- Logging AWS WAF web ACL traffic — request logs with rule-match detail
- Access logs for your Application Load Balancer — S3-only delivery, bucket policy required
- CloudFront standard logging — viewer request logs for edge analysis
FAQ
2.3 Amazon Security Lake and OCSF ★★ Important
New for SCS-C03. Security Lake builds a purpose-built security data lake in your S3 buckets: it ingests CloudTrail, VPC Flow Logs, Route 53 Resolver logs, Security Hub findings, EKS audit logs, and third-party sources, normalizes everything into the Open Cybersecurity Schema Framework (OCSF) in Parquet format, and shares it with subscribers (Athena, OpenSearch, third-party SIEMs). "Centralize security logs org-wide in a standard schema for our SIEM" is the Security Lake trigger phrase. Expect 1-2 questions.
Core docs
- What is Amazon Security Lake? — managed security data lake with OCSF normalization
- Source management in Security Lake — natively supported AWS log sources
- Subscriber management in Security Lake — data access vs query access for analytics tools
- Multiple accounts and Regions — delegated administrator and rollup Regions
FAQ
2.4 Log storage and log analysis ★★ Important
Design answers converge on: centralize logs into a dedicated log-archive account, encrypt with KMS, enforce immutability with Object Lock, transition with lifecycle rules, expire on schedule. For analysis: Athena for ad hoc SQL over logs already in S3 (CloudTrail, flow logs, ALB logs — partition to cut cost); CloudWatch Logs Insights for interactive queries over log groups; CloudTrail Insights for automatic API-rate anomalies; Security Hub insights for finding groupings. The exam tests exactly these distinctions. Expect 2-3 questions.
Core docs
- Managing your storage lifecycle — transitions and expirations for log archives
- Using S3 Object Lock — immutable log retention
- Querying AWS CloudTrail logs with Athena — the canonical table definition and example queries
- Querying Amazon VPC flow logs with Athena — find rejected traffic, top talkers
- Partitioning data in Athena — reduce scanned data and cost
- Analyzing log data with CloudWatch Logs Insights — query syntax and saved queries
- Working with log groups and log streams — retention is per log group
FAQ
Deeper reading
- AWS Security Reference Architecture — Log Archive account — the centralized logging account pattern
2.5 Normalizing and correlating logs ★ Light
For "near-real-time dashboards and full-text search across many log sources", the answer is a pipeline into Amazon OpenSearch Service (via Firehose or CloudWatch Logs subscription filters, with Lambda doing transformation), or Amazon Managed Grafana for dashboarding across CloudWatch, Athena, and OpenSearch data sources. Security Lake (section 2.3) is the managed normalization answer. Know the shapes, not the operational detail.
Core docs
- What is Amazon OpenSearch Service? — search and dashboards for log analytics
- What is Amazon Managed Grafana? — managed dashboards over security data sources
- What is Amazon Data Firehose? — managed delivery with optional Lambda transformation
- Real-time processing with subscription filters — fan CloudWatch Logs out to analysis pipelines
2.6 Application and data-access log sources ★★ Important
Skill 1.2.1 is about matching the log source to the question being asked. Who read this S3 object: CloudTrail data events (structured, reliable, per-API JSON) vs S3 server access logs (free, best-effort text — fine for billing analysis, not for security assurance). Who invoked this function: Lambda's CloudWatch logs plus CloudTrail data events for invocations. What hit the API: API Gateway execution and access logs. What hit the distribution: CloudFront standard logs. Know the reliability and cost trade-offs of each pair. Expect 1-2 questions.
Core docs
- Logging requests with server access logging — free, best-effort; compare with CloudTrail data events
- Logging data events — the structured, reliable alternative for S3 and Lambda
- Sending Lambda function logs to CloudWatch Logs — application-level function logging
- Setting up CloudWatch logging for a REST API in API Gateway — execution vs access logs
- CloudFront standard logging — viewer request logs for edge analysis
Deeper reading
- AWS security logging capabilities reference — the source-by-source comparison
Chapter 3 — Troubleshooting monitoring and logging
Maps to Task 1.3 — Troubleshoot security monitoring, logging, and alerting solutions
Skills:
- Skill 1.3.1: Analyze the functionality, permissions, and configuration of resources (for example, Lambda function logging, Amazon API Gateway logging, health checks, Amazon CloudFront logging).
- Skill 1.3.2: Remediate misconfiguration of resources (for example, by troubleshooting CloudWatch Agent configurations, troubleshooting missing logs).
3.1 Troubleshooting missing logs ★★ Important
The usual culprits, in the order to check them: the delivery target's resource policy (S3 bucket policy or CloudWatch Logs resource policy) does not allow the logging service; the KMS key policy does not grant the service; the delivery IAM role is missing permissions; the CloudWatch agent is not installed or its role lacks CloudWatchAgentServerPolicy; or retention/lifecycle already expired the data. Lambda needs logs:CreateLogGroup/CreateLogStream/PutLogEvents in its execution role; API Gateway needs an account-level CloudWatch role ARN for execution logging. Expect 2-3 questions.
Core docs
- Installing the CloudWatch agent — agent + IAM role for custom metrics and logs
- Troubleshooting the CloudWatch agent — missing metrics, credential and permission failures
- Amazon S3 bucket policy for CloudTrail — required statements for log delivery
- Sending Lambda function logs to CloudWatch Logs — execution role permissions for logging
- Setting up CloudWatch logging for a REST API in API Gateway — the account-level logging role
- Troubleshooting Amazon EventBridge — rule matched but target never ran
3.2 Troubleshooting alerting pipelines ★★ Important
When an alert never fired: the metric filter pattern did not match the log format, the alarm is on the wrong statistic/period or stuck in INSUFFICIENT_DATA, the SNS topic policy does not allow the publishing service, the EventBridge rule pattern does not match the event structure, or Security Hub is not enabled in the finding's Region (findings are Regional unless cross-Region aggregation is on). Health checks that report healthy while users see failures usually check the wrong path or port. Expect 1-2 questions.
Core docs
- Using Amazon CloudWatch alarms — alarm states and evaluation semantics
- SNS access control — topic policies; why a service cannot publish without them
- Security Hub central configuration — keeping standards and Regions consistent across the organization
- How Route 53 checks the health of your resources — health check mechanics
Part II — Domain 2: Incident Response (14%)
Incident response is now a standalone domain: plan, prepare, test, automate, and respond. The AWS Security Incident Response Guide vocabulary — preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication, recovery — runs through every question, and the new ordering question type loves containment sequences.
Chapter 4 — Incident response planning and testing
Maps to Task 2.1 — Design and test an incident response plan
Skills:
- Skill 2.1.1: Design and implement response plans and runbooks to respond to security incidents (for example, Systems Manager OpsCenter, Amazon SageMaker AI notebooks).
- Skill 2.1.2: Use AWS service features and capabilities to configure services to be prepared for incidents (for example, by provisioning access, deploying security tools, minimizing the blast radius, configuring AWS Shield Advanced protections).
- Skill 2.1.3: Recommend procedures to test and validate the effectiveness of an incident response plan (for example, AWS Fault Injection Service, AWS Resilience Hub).
- Skill 2.1.4: Use AWS services to automatically remediate incidents (for example, Systems Manager, Automated Forensics Orchestrator for Amazon EC2, AWS Step Functions, Amazon Application Recovery Controller, Lambda functions).
4.1 Incident response planning in AWS ★★★ Core
The AWS Security Incident Response Guide supplies the exam's vocabulary and its runbook logic. Know the credential-compromise runbook cold — deactivate access keys, revoke role session credentials, rotate secrets, review CloudTrail — and know which service performs each step. Runbooks live as Systems Manager Automation documents; OpsCenter tracks operational incidents as OpsItems. Preparation means pre-provisioned break-glass access, pre-deployed security tooling, and blast-radius-limiting account structure. Expect 2-4 questions.
Core docs
- AWS Security Incident Response Guide — the canonical whitepaper; read it end to end
- AWS Systems Manager OpsCenter — central OpsItems for incident tracking
- AWS Systems Manager Automation — runbooks as code
- Managing access keys for IAM users — deactivate vs delete, rotation workflow
- Revoking IAM role temporary security credentials — cut off stolen session tokens
- Rotate AWS Secrets Manager secrets — automated rotation as an invalidation strategy
Deeper reading
- AWS Well-Architected Framework — Security Pillar: Incident response — the design principles behind the questions
- AWS Customer Playbook Framework (GitHub) — sample playbooks for compromised IAM credentials, S3, EC2
4.2 Testing and validating response plans ★ Light
New emphasis in C03: game days and chaos engineering. AWS Fault Injection Service (FIS) runs controlled fault-injection experiments (instance termination, API throttling, network disruption) with stop conditions tied to CloudWatch alarms; Resilience Hub assesses applications against resiliency policies (RTO/RPO) and recommends fixes. "Validate the incident response plan actually works" maps to FIS experiments and simulated events. Usually one question.
Core docs
- What is AWS Fault Injection Service? — controlled chaos experiments with guardrails
- What is AWS Resilience Hub? — resiliency assessment against RTO/RPO policies
- Amazon Application Recovery Controller — readiness checks and routing controls for failover
4.3 Automated remediation ★★ Important
The exam's favourite automation chain: GuardDuty or Security Hub finding → EventBridge rule → Lambda function, Systems Manager Automation runbook, or Step Functions state machine → remediation plus SNS notification. Pick Lambda for simple single-step fixes, Step Functions for multi-step workflows with approval, SSM runbooks for actions on instances, and the Automated Forensics Orchestrator solution when the requirement is automated evidence capture from compromised EC2. Expect 2-3 questions.
Core docs
- AWS Systems Manager Automation — runbooks for operational remediation
- What is AWS Step Functions? — orchestrate multi-step response workflows
- Remediating noncompliant resources with AWS Config — automatic remediation via SSM Automation documents
- Security Hub custom actions — analyst-triggered remediation through EventBridge
- Automated Forensics Orchestrator for Amazon EC2 (AWS Solution) — automated memory and disk acquisition, named in the exam guide
Deeper reading
- Automated Security Response on AWS (AWS Solution) — prebuilt remediations mapped to Security Hub controls
Chapter 5 — Responding to security events
Maps to Task 2.2 — Respond to security events
Skills:
- Skill 2.2.1: Capture and store relevant system and application logs as forensic artifacts.
- Skill 2.2.2: Search and correlate logs for security events across applications and AWS services.
- Skill 2.2.3: Validate findings from AWS security services to assess the scope and impact of an event.
- Skill 2.2.4: Respond to affected resources by containing and eradicating threats, and recover resources (for example, by implementing network containment controls, restoring backups).
- Skill 2.2.5: Describe methods to conduct root cause analysis (for example, Amazon Detective).
5.1 Containing and recovering compromised resources ★★★ Core
Memorise the EC2 isolation sequence — it is a natural ordering question: snapshot the EBS volumes first, capture a memory dump if needed, swap the instance into an isolation security group with no rules (removing it from the ASG/ELB), tag it for the forensics team, and never terminate before evidence capture. Stopping an instance loses memory contents; security group changes do not kill existing tracked connections. Recovery means restoring from backups known to predate the compromise. For credentials: deactivate the key, revoke sessions, review CloudTrail. Expect 2-3 questions.
Core docs
- Remediating GuardDuty findings — per-resource remediation steps for EC2, S3, IAM
- Amazon EBS snapshots — point-in-time evidence capture
- Security groups for your VPC — isolation SG pattern; connection tracking caveat
- Instance lifecycle — stop vs terminate vs hibernate and what each preserves
- Restoring a backup with AWS Backup — the recovery half of Skill 2.2.4
5.2 Forensic artifact capture and preservation ★★ Important
Evidence must be immutable and access-controlled: replicate CloudTrail logs and disk images to a dedicated, isolated forensics account; enforce immutability with S3 Object Lock in compliance mode; keep chain of custody with restricted IAM roles. Know Object Lock modes (governance can be bypassed with s3:BypassGovernanceRetention, compliance cannot — not even by root) and legal holds, and that EBS snapshots can be shared into the forensic account. Expect 1-2 questions.
Core docs
- Using S3 Object Lock — WORM storage; governance vs compliance mode, legal holds
- Replicating objects — cross-account, cross-Region copies of evidence
- Create Amazon EBS snapshots — sharing snapshots into a forensic account
- Automated Forensics Orchestrator for Amazon EC2 (AWS Solution) — automated acquisition into an isolated account
Deeper reading
- AWS Security Reference Architecture — Security Tooling account — the dedicated tooling / forensics account pattern
5.3 Investigation and root cause analysis ★★ Important
The division of labour the exam tests: GuardDuty detects, Detective investigates (behaviour graph over CloudTrail, VPC Flow Logs, GuardDuty findings — "what did this role/IP/instance do around the finding"), Athena and CloudTrail Lake query raw logs for scope, and Security Hub tracks the finding's workflow status. Validating a finding means correlating it across sources: the GuardDuty finding, the CloudTrail entries, and the flow log records that corroborate it. Expect 2-3 questions.
Core docs
- What is Amazon Detective? — behaviour graph for security investigation
- Source data used in a behavior graph — CloudTrail, VPC Flow Logs, GuardDuty, EKS audit logs
- Investigating a GuardDuty finding in Detective — pivot from GuardDuty console into Detective
- Querying AWS CloudTrail logs with Athena — scope an incident from raw API history
FAQ
5.4 Triaging findings ★★ Important
Skill 2.2.3 tests finding hygiene: assess scope and impact before acting. In Security Hub, severity plus the workflow status field (NEW, NOTIFIED, SUPPRESSED, RESOLVED) tracks triage state; GuardDuty severity levels (low/medium/high) and finding details (resource, actor, first/last seen) size the blast radius; suppression rules archive expected findings without disabling detection. A finding is validated when independent sources corroborate it — the CloudTrail entries and flow log records behind the GuardDuty finding. Expect 1-2 questions.
Core docs
- Reviewing finding details in Security Hub — severity, workflow status, resource detail
- Understanding GuardDuty findings — severity levels and finding anatomy
- GuardDuty suppression rules — archive expected findings, keep detection on
- CloudTrail log event reference — corroborate who did what, from where
Part III — Domain 3: Infrastructure Security (18%)
Edge protection (WAF, Shield, CloudFront), compute hardening (AMIs, Inspector, Systems Manager, and — new in C03 — generative AI guardrails and pipeline scanning), and VPC network controls. Expect roughly 9 scored questions.
Chapter 6 — Edge security
Maps to Task 3.1 — Design, implement, and troubleshoot security controls for network edge services
Skills:
- Skill 3.1.1: Define and select edge security strategies based on anticipated threats and attacks.
- Skill 3.1.2: Implement appropriate network edge protection (for example, CloudFront headers, AWS WAF, AWS IoT policies, protecting against OWASP Top 10 threats, Amazon S3 cross-origin resource sharing [CORS], Shield Advanced).
- Skill 3.1.3: Design and implement AWS edge controls and rules based on requirements (for example, geography, geolocation, rate limiting, client fingerprinting).
- Skill 3.1.4: Configure integrations with AWS edge services and third-party services (for example, by ingesting data in Open Cybersecurity Schema Framework [OCSF] format, by using third-party WAF rules).
6.1 AWS WAF ★★★ Core
Know what WAF attaches to (CloudFront, ALB, API Gateway, AppSync — not NLB, not EC2 directly), web ACL structure (rules, rule groups, priority, default action), managed rule groups (Core rule set for OWASP-style threats, IP reputation, Bot Control — Bot Control's JA3/client fingerprinting covers Skill 3.1.3's "client fingerprinting"), rate-based rules for HTTP floods, geo-match statements, and third-party Marketplace rule groups for Skill 3.1.4. SQL injection and XSS scenarios are answered with WAF managed rules. Expect 2-4 questions.
Core docs
- What is AWS WAF? — layer 7 filtering for supported resources
- Web access control lists (web ACLs) — rules, priority, default action
- Managed rule groups — Core rule set, known bad inputs, IP reputation
- AWS WAF Bot Control — bot detection and client fingerprinting signals
- Rate-based rule statement — throttle or block flooding IPs
- Geographic match rule statement — country-based allow/block
- Logging AWS WAF web ACL traffic — evidence of what a rule matched and why
FAQ
6.2 AWS Shield ★★ Important
Shield Standard is free, automatic, and covers common layer 3/4 attacks for everyone. Shield Advanced adds cost protection, 24/7 access to the Shield Response Team (SRT), advanced attack diagnostics, health-based detection, and automatic application-layer DDoS mitigation (which deploys WAF rules for you) — for CloudFront, Route 53, Global Accelerator, ALB, NLB, and Elastic IPs. "SRT" or "cost protection" in the question means Shield Advanced; Skill 2.1.2 also names pre-configuring Shield Advanced as incident preparation. Expect 1-2 questions.
Core docs
- How AWS Shield and Shield Advanced work — Standard vs Advanced capabilities
- AWS Shield Advanced protected resources — what can be protected
- Shield Response Team (SRT) support — engagement requires Business or Enterprise Support
FAQ
Deeper reading
- AWS Best Practices for DDoS Resiliency — the layered edge architecture the exam draws from
6.3 Amazon CloudFront and S3 edge security ★★ Important
CloudFront questions are about restricting access: Origin Access Control so S3 is reachable only through the distribution, custom origin headers verified at the ALB so nobody bypasses CloudFront, signed URLs/cookies for private content, geo restriction, HTTPS enforcement both viewer-side and origin-side, response security headers via response headers policies (Skill 3.1.2's "CloudFront headers"), and field-level encryption. S3 CORS controls which browser origins may call a bucket — a misconfigured wildcard is the exam's favourite CORS flaw. Expect 2-3 questions.
Core docs
- Restricting access to an Amazon S3 origin (OAC) — OAC replaces legacy OAI; bucket policy allows only the distribution
- Serving private content with signed URLs and signed cookies — trusted key groups, when to use URLs vs cookies
- Adding or removing HTTP headers in CloudFront responses — managed security-headers policy
- Restricting the geographic distribution of your content — allow/block lists by country
- Using HTTPS with CloudFront — viewer and origin protocol policies; ACM certificate must be in us-east-1
- Using cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) — S3 CORS configuration
- Restricting access to Application Load Balancers — custom header verification and the managed prefix list
FAQ
6.4 Route 53 and IoT edge controls ★ Light
Quick distinctions: Route 53 Resolver DNS Firewall blocks queries to known-bad domains from your VPCs; DNSSEC signing protects public hosted zones from spoofing; AWS IoT Core policies (named in Skill 3.1.2) authorize device MQTT actions per certificate identity — least privilege applies to things too. Usually one distinguishing question.
Core docs
- Route 53 Resolver DNS Firewall — filter outbound DNS from VPCs
- Configuring DNSSEC signing — KMS-backed zone signing
- AWS IoT Core policies — device-level authorization
FAQ
Chapter 7 — Compute security
Maps to Task 3.2 — Design, implement, and troubleshoot security controls for compute workloads
Skills:
- Skill 3.2.1: Design and implement hardened Amazon EC2 AMIs and container images to secure compute workloads and embed security controls (for example, Systems Manager, EC2 Image Builder).
- Skill 3.2.2: Apply instance profiles, service roles, and execution roles appropriately to authorize compute workloads.
- Skill 3.2.3: Scan compute resources for known vulnerabilities (for example, scan container images and Lambda functions by using Amazon Inspector, monitor compute runtimes by using GuardDuty).
- Skill 3.2.4: Deploy patches across compute resources to maintain secure and compliant environments by automating update processes and by integrating continuous validation (for example, Systems Manager Patch Manager, Amazon Inspector).
- Skill 3.2.5: Configure secure administrative access to compute resources (for example, Systems Manager Session Manager, EC2 Instance Connect).
- Skill 3.2.6: Configure security tools to discover and remediate vulnerabilities within a pipeline (for example, Amazon Q Developer, Amazon CodeGuru Security).
- Skill 3.2.7: Implement protections and guardrails for generative AI applications (for example, by applying GenAI OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications protections).
7.1 Hardened AMIs, images, and workload roles ★★ Important
Know golden-image pipelines with EC2 Image Builder (hardening components, Inspector test stages, automated distribution), IMDSv2 (session-oriented, token via PUT, defends against SSRF credential theft — enforce with HttpTokens=required), and the role taxonomy of Skill 3.2.2: instance profiles for EC2, task roles for ECS, execution roles for Lambda — each scoping least privilege to the workload, never embedded credentials. Never put secrets in user data. Expect 2-3 questions.
Core docs
- What is EC2 Image Builder? — automated hardened AMI and container image pipelines
- Use IMDSv2 — token-based metadata; require it fleet-wide
- IAM roles for Amazon EC2 — instance profiles deliver temporary credentials
- Amazon ECS task IAM role — per-task least privilege
- Lambda execution role — function permissions
- Block public access for EBS snapshots — prevent accidental public snapshots
- Work with instance user data — why secrets never belong here
FAQ
7.2 Vulnerability scanning and patching ★★★ Core
Inspector continuously scans EC2 instances (SSM-agent-based or agentless), ECR container images (enhanced scanning on push and continuously), and Lambda functions for CVEs; findings carry a risk score and flow to Security Hub. GuardDuty Runtime Monitoring covers behavioural threats at runtime — the C03 skill statement pairs them deliberately: Inspector finds vulnerabilities, GuardDuty spots active exploitation. Patch Manager closes the loop with baselines, patch groups, and maintenance windows. Expect 2-4 questions.
Core docs
- What is Amazon Inspector? — continuous vulnerability management
- Scanning Amazon EC2 instances — SSM-agent-based and agentless scanning
- Scanning Amazon ECR container images — enhanced scanning on push and continuously
- Scanning AWS Lambda functions — code and dependency vulnerabilities
- GuardDuty Runtime Monitoring — runtime threat detection for EC2, ECS, EKS
- AWS Systems Manager Patch Manager — baselines, patch groups, maintenance windows
- Image scanning in Amazon ECR — basic vs enhanced (Inspector) scanning
FAQ
7.3 Secure administrative access ★★ Important
The modern answer to "SSH/RDP access without exposing ports": Session Manager — no inbound rules, no bastion, no key management, IAM-controlled, and every session can be logged to S3/CloudWatch Logs with KMS encryption. Port forwarding covers RDP and database tunnels. EC2 Instance Connect pushes short-lived SSH keys via IAM but still needs port 22 open. If the question emphasises auditability of interactive access, it is Session Manager. Expect 1-2 questions.
Core docs
- AWS Systems Manager Session Manager — portless, auditable shell access
- Logging session activity — S3 and CloudWatch Logs session records
- Starting a session with port forwarding — tunnel RDP and databases through SSM
- Connect using EC2 Instance Connect — ephemeral SSH keys via the metadata service
FAQ
7.4 Pipeline security tooling ★ Light
New for C03, Skill 3.2.6: shifting security left into the pipeline. Amazon CodeGuru Security scans code for security vulnerabilities and hardcoded secrets in CI/CD; Amazon Q Developer scans and suggests remediations from the IDE. Know which tool sits where (pipeline scan vs developer assistant) — usually one distinguishing question.
Core docs
- What is Amazon CodeGuru Security? — static analysis for vulnerabilities in pipelines
- What is Amazon Q Developer? — AI assistant with code security scanning
- Amazon Q Developer security scanning — detect vulnerabilities from the IDE
7.5 Securing generative AI applications ★★ Important
Entirely new for SCS-C03 (Skill 3.2.7). Know the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications categories at a recognition level (prompt injection, insecure output handling, sensitive information disclosure, model denial of service) and the AWS controls that map to them: Amazon Bedrock Guardrails (content filters, denied topics, sensitive-information/PII filters, prompt-attack filters), Bedrock's data-privacy posture (prompts and completions are not used to train base models, stay in-Region), IAM and PrivateLink for model access, and CloudWatch/CloudTrail for invocation logging. SageMaker AI notebook and endpoint security rounds it out. Expect 1-2 questions.
Core docs
- Amazon Bedrock Guardrails — content filters, denied topics, PII redaction, prompt-attack protection
- Security in Amazon Bedrock — data privacy, encryption, PrivateLink access
- Model invocation logging — audit prompts and completions to CloudWatch/S3
- Security in Amazon SageMaker AI — notebook, training, and endpoint isolation
Deeper reading
- OWASP Top 10 for Large Language Model Applications — the threat taxonomy named in the exam guide
Chapter 8 — Network security controls
Maps to Task 3.3 — Design and troubleshoot network security controls
Skills:
- Skill 3.3.1: Design and troubleshoot appropriate network controls to permit or prevent network traffic as required (for example, security groups, network ACLs, AWS Network Firewall).
- Skill 3.3.2: Design secure connectivity between hybrid and multi-cloud networks (for example, AWS Site-to-Site VPN, AWS Direct Connect, MAC Security [MACsec]).
- Skill 3.3.3: Determine and configure security workload requirements for communication between hybrid environments and AWS (for example, by using AWS Verified Access).
- Skill 3.3.4: Design network segmentation based on security requirements (for example, north/south and east/west traffic protections, isolated subnets).
- Skill 3.3.5: Identify unnecessary network access (for example, AWS Verified Access, Network Access Analyzer, Amazon Inspector network reachability findings).
8.1 Security groups and network ACLs ★★★ Core
Absolute must-know: security groups are stateful, allow-only, instance/ENI-level, and can reference other security groups; NACLs are stateless, ordered allow-and-deny rules, subnet-level, and need ephemeral port ranges for return traffic. To block a specific IP, use a NACL deny (security groups cannot deny). Connection tracking means tightening a security group does not cut established flows. Expect 2-4 questions, plus these concepts embedded everywhere.
Core docs
- Control traffic to your AWS resources using security groups — stateful rules, SG references
- Control subnet traffic with network access control lists — rule numbers, deny rules, ephemeral ports
- Internetwork traffic privacy in Amazon VPC — the comparison table the exam quotes
- Security group connection tracking — why revoked rules do not kill live sessions
- Subnets for your VPC — public vs private segmentation via route tables
8.2 Network Firewall and segmentation ★★ Important
Network Firewall is the managed, stateful, Suricata-compatible firewall for when security groups and NACLs are not enough: domain filtering for egress, IDS/IPS signatures, and east/west inspection between VPCs or subnets. Know the deployment model (firewall endpoints in dedicated subnets, routed through via route tables, often centralized behind a Transit Gateway inspection VPC) and stateless vs stateful rule groups. Segmentation questions (Skill 3.3.4) combine isolated subnets, TGW route tables, and Network Firewall for north/south and east/west control. Expect 2-3 questions.
Core docs
- What is AWS Network Firewall? — stateful managed network firewall
- Firewall behavior in AWS Network Firewall — stateless then stateful evaluation
- Rule groups in AWS Network Firewall — Suricata rules, domain lists
- Deployment architectures for Network Firewall — inspection VPC and routing patterns
- What is a transit gateway? — hub-and-spoke with route-table segmentation
FAQ
8.3 Hybrid and multi-cloud connectivity ★★ Important
Know the encryption story for each option: Site-to-Site VPN is IPsec-encrypted by default (two tunnels per connection); Direct Connect is private but NOT encrypted — add a VPN over the DX connection for IPsec, or use MACsec for layer 2 encryption on supported dedicated connections. Transit Gateway hubs many VPCs and on-premises links; VPC peering is non-transitive. Expect 1-2 questions.
Core docs
- What is AWS Site-to-Site VPN? — IPsec tunnels, two tunnels per connection
- What is AWS Direct Connect? — dedicated private connectivity; not encrypted by itself
- MACsec security on Direct Connect — layer 2 encryption for dedicated connections
- Direct Connect + VPN — encrypted traffic over dedicated connectivity
- VPC peering — one-to-one, non-transitive
FAQ
8.4 Verified Access and finding unnecessary access ★★ Important
AWS Verified Access (new in C03) provides VPN-less, zero-trust access to internal applications: every request is evaluated against identity (IAM Identity Center or OIDC) and device-trust signals before reaching the app. For "identify unnecessary network access" (Skill 3.3.5): Network Access Analyzer finds unintended network paths at scale against a scope you define; Inspector's network reachability findings flag instances exposed to the internet; flow log REJECT records confirm what got blocked at runtime. Expect 1-2 questions.
Core docs
- What is AWS Verified Access? — zero-trust application access without VPN
- Verified Access policies — Cedar-based identity and device-trust rules
- What is Network Access Analyzer? — verify no unintended access exists
- What is VPC Reachability Analyzer? — point-to-point path analysis for troubleshooting
- Amazon Inspector finding types — network reachability findings
Part IV — Domain 4: Identity and Access Management (20%)
Now the joint-largest domain, up from 16% in SCS-C02 — AWS is telling you identity is the perimeter. Policy evaluation logic and cross-account access patterns are also embedded in questions from every other domain. If you master one thing for this exam, master this.
Chapter 9 — Authentication
Maps to Task 4.1 — Design, implement, and troubleshoot authentication strategies
Skills:
- Skill 4.1.1: Design and establish identity solutions for human, application, and system authentication (for example, AWS IAM Identity Center, Amazon Cognito, multi-factor authentication [MFA], identity provider [IdP] integration).
- Skill 4.1.2: Configure mechanisms to issue temporary credentials (for example, AWS Security Token Service [AWS STS], Amazon S3 presigned URLs).
- Skill 4.1.3: Troubleshooting authentication issues (for example, CloudTrail, Amazon Cognito, IAM Identity Center permission sets, AWS Directory Service).
9.1 IAM identities and credential management ★★★ Core
The baseline hygiene the exam assumes everywhere: no long-term access keys where a role would do, MFA on privileged identities (and the aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent condition to enforce it in policies), credential reports to audit key age and MFA status, Access Advisor for last-used services, and locked-down root (no access keys, MFA, used only for root-only tasks). Expect 2-3 questions plus constant background presence.
Core docs
- What is IAM? — users, groups, roles, policies
- Security best practices in IAM — the checklist the exam is written from
- Using multi-factor authentication (MFA) in AWS — device types and enforcement
- Configuring MFA-protected API access — aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent in conditions
- Getting credential reports for your AWS account — audit key age, MFA, password status
- Refining permissions using access information — Access Advisor last-accessed data
- Root user best practices — protect and barely use the root user
FAQ
9.2 STS and temporary credentials ★★★ Core
Roles and STS are the answer to nearly every credential question. Know AssumeRole (cross-account, requires a trust policy AND permission to call sts:AssumeRole), AssumeRoleWithSAML and AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity (federation), external ID to prevent the confused deputy problem with third parties, session duration limits, and how to revoke active sessions (temporary credentials cannot be revoked individually — you invalidate them with a policy condition on TokenIssueTime). S3 presigned URLs, named in Skill 4.1.2, inherit the signer's permissions and expire — a compromised presigned URL is limited by the signing role's session. Expect 2-4 questions.
Core docs
- Requesting temporary security credentials — the STS API family compared
- IAM roles — trust policy plus permissions policy
- How to use an external ID with third parties — the confused deputy mitigation
- The confused deputy problem — aws:SourceArn and aws:SourceAccount for service principals
- Revoking IAM role temporary security credentials — deny sessions issued before a timestamp
- Sharing objects with presigned URLs — time-limited access under the signer's permissions
- Cross-account access using roles — the canonical delegation walkthrough
9.3 Federation and IAM Identity Center ★★ Important
Map the identity source to the mechanism: corporate workforce at scale across many accounts → IAM Identity Center permission sets (which materialize as roles in each account), with SCIM provisioning from an external IdP; legacy direct federation → SAML 2.0 IdP in IAM; consumer/mobile app users → Cognito; self-managed Active Directory → AWS Managed Microsoft AD or AD Connector. Troubleshooting permission sets (Skill 4.1.3) usually comes down to propagation or the underlying role's policies. Expect 2-3 questions.
Core docs
- What is IAM Identity Center? — workforce SSO across accounts and apps
- Permission sets — templates that become roles in member accounts
- Identity providers and federation — SAML 2.0 and OIDC providers in IAM
- About SAML 2.0-based federation — legacy direct-to-IAM federation
- AWS Directory Service — AWS Managed Microsoft AD vs AD Connector
9.4 Amazon Cognito ★★ Important
Cognito is the "customer-facing application users" answer: user pools authenticate and issue JWTs; identity pools exchange tokens for temporary AWS credentials via STS, with authenticated and unauthenticated roles. C03 names Cognito in both authentication design and troubleshooting skills — know token types (ID vs access vs refresh) and where a misconfigured app client or callback URL breaks the flow. Expect 1-2 questions.
Core docs
- What is Amazon Cognito? — user pools vs identity pools
- Amazon Cognito identity pools — federated access to AWS resources
- Using tokens with user pools — ID, access, and refresh tokens
FAQ
9.5 Troubleshooting authentication ★★ Important
Skill 4.1.3 is its own troubleshooting discipline. CloudTrail records every sign-in and AssumeRole attempt — ConsoleLogin events show MFA use and failure reasons; AccessDenied on sts:AssumeRole means the trust policy, the caller's IAM permission, or a condition (external ID, MFA) failed. Identity Center problems are usually permission-set propagation or attribute mapping from the IdP; Cognito failures are app client settings, callback URLs, or token expiry; Directory Service failures are trust relationships and DNS. Expect 1-2 questions.
Core docs
- Logging IAM and AWS STS API calls with CloudTrail — reading sign-in and AssumeRole events
- Troubleshooting IAM — the index of authentication failure modes
- Troubleshooting IAM Identity Center issues — permission set and provisioning problems
- AWS Directory Service — trust and connectivity prerequisites
Chapter 10 — Authorization
Maps to Task 4.2 — Design, implement, and troubleshoot authorization strategies
Skills:
- Skill 4.2.1: Design and evaluate authorization controls for human, application, and system access (for example, Amazon Verified Permissions, IAM paths, IAM Roles Anywhere, resource policies for cross-account access, IAM role trust policies).
- Skill 4.2.2: Design attribute-based access control (ABAC) and role-based access control (RBAC) strategies (for example, by configuring resource access based on tags or attributes).
- Skill 4.2.3: Design, interpret, and implement IAM policies by following the principle of least privilege (for example, permission boundaries, session policies).
- Skill 4.2.4: Analyze authorization failures to determine causes or effects (for example, IAM Policy Simulator, IAM Access Analyzer).
- Skill 4.2.5: Investigate and correct unintended permissions, authorizations, or privileges granted to a resource, service, or entity (for example, IAM Access Analyzer).
10.1 IAM policy types and evaluation logic ★★★ Core
The single most important page for this exam is the policy evaluation logic: explicit deny always wins; then SCPs, RCPs, resource-based policies, identity-based policies, permissions boundaries, and session policies combine to determine the allow. Within one account, either an identity-based OR a resource-based policy allow is sufficient; cross-account requires an allow on both sides. Be able to read Principal, NotPrincipal, NotAction, Condition operators, and policy variables. Expect 4-6 questions that hinge on this.
Core docs
- Policies and permissions in IAM — the policy types
- Policy evaluation logic — read this until you can draw the flowchart
- IAM JSON policy elements reference — Effect, Principal, Action, Resource, Condition
- IAM JSON policy element: Condition operators — StringEquals, ArnLike, IpAddress, Null
- AWS global condition context keys — aws:PrincipalOrgID, aws:SourceIp, aws:SecureTransport, aws:PrincipalTag
- Identity-based policies and resource-based policies — when each applies
- Managed policies and inline policies — reuse vs strict one-to-one
10.2 Cross-account access and trust policies ★★★ Core
Know the two cross-account patterns: a resource-based policy naming the foreign principal (S3, KMS, SQS, SNS, Lambda, Secrets Manager support them) versus assuming a role in the resource account — and that role trust policies (named in Skill 4.2.1) are themselves resource-based policies on the role. aws:PrincipalOrgID restricts a resource policy to your whole organization in one condition; aws:SourceArn/aws:SourceAccount block the confused deputy for service principals. S3 bucket policy questions are guaranteed. Expect 3-4 questions.
Core docs
- Bucket policies for Amazon S3 — structure and evaluation with IAM
- Bucket policy examples — enforce TLS, restrict by VPC endpoint, require encryption
- How Amazon S3 authorizes a request — union of policies plus ownership rules
- Key policies in AWS KMS — the KMS twist: key policy is mandatory
- IAM role trust policies — who may assume the role, under what conditions
10.3 ABAC, RBAC, boundaries, and session policies ★★★ Core
ABAC scales permissions with tags: aws:PrincipalTag matched against resource tags means new projects need no policy changes — the exam contrasts it with RBAC (a role per function, more policies to maintain). Permissions boundaries cap what an identity-based policy can grant — the classic use is safe delegated IAM administration ("developers may create roles but only within this boundary"). Session policies scope down a single assumed-role session. Boundaries and session policies grant nothing on their own — the effective permission is the intersection. Expect 2-3 questions.
Core docs
- What is ABAC for AWS? — tag-based access control
- IAM tutorial: Define permissions based on attributes with ABAC — the worked example the exam paraphrases
- Controlling access to AWS resources using tags — aws:ResourceTag and aws:RequestTag conditions
- Permissions boundaries for IAM entities — maximum-permission guardrails
- Session policies — scope down assumed-role sessions
10.4 IAM Roles Anywhere and Verified Permissions ★ Light
Two new C03 name-drops. IAM Roles Anywhere issues temporary AWS credentials to workloads outside AWS that authenticate with X.509 certificates from your CA (registered as a trust anchor) — the answer to "on-premises servers need AWS credentials without long-term keys". Amazon Verified Permissions is fine-grained application-level authorization using the Cedar policy language — authorization inside your app, not for AWS resources. One distinguishing question each at most.
Core docs
- What is IAM Roles Anywhere? — certificate-based credentials for external workloads
- What is Amazon Verified Permissions? — Cedar-based application authorization
- IAM identifiers (paths) — IAM paths for organizing and scoping entities
10.5 Troubleshooting authorization ★★ Important
Given an AccessDenied, work the layers in order: explicit deny somewhere (SCP, RCP, boundary, resource policy)? Missing allow (cross-account needs both sides)? Wrong principal or condition? Tools: IAM policy simulator to test policies without executing, CloudTrail errorCode/errorMessage to see the denied call and which policy type denied it, Access Advisor for unused permissions, and IAM Access Analyzer both to find unintended external/unused access (Skill 4.2.5) and to validate policies at author time. Expect 2-3 questions.
Core docs
- Testing IAM policies with the IAM policy simulator — simulate before you deploy
- Troubleshooting access denied error messages — decoding which policy type caused the deny
- What is IAM Access Analyzer? — external and unused access analysis
- Findings for external access — resources shared outside the zone of trust
- IAM Access Analyzer policy generation — least-privilege policies from CloudTrail history
- IAM Access Analyzer policy validation — catch errors and over-broad grants at author time
Part V — Domain 5: Data Protection (18%)
Encryption in transit, encryption at rest, and the protection of secrets and key material. KMS is the centre of gravity — expect it to be the single most-tested service on your exam form.
Chapter 11 — Data in transit
Maps to Task 5.1 — Design and implement controls for data in transit
Skills:
- Skill 5.1.1: Design and configure mechanisms to require encryption when connecting to resources (for example, by configuring Elastic Load Balancing [ELB] security policies, by enforcing TLS configurations).
- Skill 5.1.2: Design and configure mechanisms for secure and private access to resources (for example, AWS PrivateLink, VPC endpoints, AWS Client VPN, AWS Verified Access).
- Skill 5.1.3: Design and configure inter-resource encryption in transit (for example, inter-node encryption configurations for Amazon EMR, Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service [Amazon EKS], SageMaker AI, Nitro encryption).
11.1 Enforcing TLS and certificates ★★★ Core
Know the enforcement mechanism per service: S3 bucket policy denying aws:SecureTransport false; ALB/NLB TLS listeners with security policies pinning minimum TLS versions (Skill 5.1.1 names ELB security policies explicitly); RDS parameter rds.force_ssl; API Gateway minimum TLS via custom domain security policy; EFS file system policy requiring TLS mounts. ACM supplies the certificates: free public certs, auto-renewing with DNS validation, non-exportable, attachable to ELB/CloudFront/API Gateway — never directly to EC2. Expect 2-4 questions.
Core docs
- Security policies for your Application Load Balancer — TLS listener configuration and minimum versions
- Amazon S3 security best practices — the deny-non-TLS bucket policy pattern
- What is AWS Certificate Manager? — provisioning and automatic renewal
- Validating domain ownership — DNS vs email validation and renewal implications
- Services integrated with ACM — where ACM certificates can be used
- Using SSL/TLS to encrypt a connection to a DB instance — per-engine enforcement
- Encrypting data in transit — Amazon EFS — TLS mount helper
- Choosing a minimum TLS version for a custom domain in API Gateway — security policy on custom domains
FAQ
11.2 Private access: PrivateLink, VPC endpoints, and Client VPN ★★★ Core
"Keep traffic off the public internet" almost always means VPC endpoints. Know gateway endpoints (S3 and DynamoDB only, free, route-table entry) vs interface endpoints (PrivateLink, ENI with private IP, most services, hourly cost); endpoint policies to restrict which principals/resources can be reached; and the bucket-policy pattern aws:SourceVpce to require access through a specific endpoint. AWS Client VPN provides TLS-based remote user access into a VPC; Verified Access is its zero-trust, per-application alternative. Expect 2-3 questions.
Core docs
- What is AWS PrivateLink? — private connectivity to services and endpoints
- Access AWS services through AWS PrivateLink — interface endpoints for AWS APIs
- Gateway endpoints for Amazon S3 — route-table based, no cost
- Control access to VPC endpoints using endpoint policies — restrict actions, principals, resources at the endpoint
- Bucket policies for VPC endpoints — aws:SourceVpce and aws:SourceVpc conditions
- What is AWS Client VPN? — managed TLS VPN for remote users
- What is AWS Verified Access? — zero-trust application access without VPN
11.3 Inter-resource encryption in transit ★ Light
New C03 skill, tested at recognition level: EMR security configurations enable in-transit encryption between cluster nodes (TLS certificates you supply); EKS traffic between pods can be encrypted and its API traffic is TLS; SageMaker AI supports inter-container traffic encryption for training jobs; and traffic between Nitro-based instances in the same VPC that supports it is transparently encrypted at the hardware layer. Learn the one-liners and move on.
Core docs
- Encryption in transit for Amazon EMR — security configurations for inter-node TLS
- Security in Amazon EKS — cluster and pod traffic protections
- SageMaker inter-container traffic encryption — encrypt distributed training traffic
- The Security Design of the AWS Nitro System — hardware-level transparent encryption
Chapter 12 — Data at rest
Maps to Task 5.2 — Design and implement controls for data at rest
Skills:
- Skill 5.2.1: Design, implement, and configure data encryption at rest based on specific requirements (for example, by selecting the appropriate encryption key service such as AWS CloudHSM or AWS Key Management Service [AWS KMS] or by selecting the appropriate encryption type such as client-side encryption or server-side encryption).
- Skill 5.2.2: Design and configure mechanisms to protect data integrity (for example, S3 Object Lock, S3 Glacier Vault Lock, versioning, digital code signing, file validation).
- Skill 5.2.3: Design automatic lifecycle management and retention solutions for data (for example, S3 Lifecycle policies, S3 Object Lock, Amazon Elastic File System [Amazon EFS] Lifecycle policies, Amazon FSx for Lustre backup policies).
- Skill 5.2.4: Design and configure secure data replication and backup solutions (for example, Amazon Data Lifecycle Manager, AWS Backup, ransomware protection, AWS DataSync).
12.1 AWS KMS fundamentals ★★★ Core
Non-negotiable knowledge: envelope encryption (KMS encrypts data keys; data keys encrypt data — GenerateDataKey is the API to know); key types (AWS managed vs customer managed vs AWS owned — only customer managed keys give you key policies, rotation control, and grants); symmetric vs asymmetric keys; the 4 KB direct-encrypt limit that forces envelope encryption; and client-side vs server-side encryption selection. KMS keys never leave KMS. Expect 4-6 questions across the exam.
Core docs
- What is AWS KMS? — managed cryptographic key service
- AWS KMS concepts — KMS keys, data keys, envelope encryption
- Symmetric and asymmetric KMS keys — choosing key specs for encryption vs signing
- Customer managed keys vs AWS managed keys — control and cost differences
- AWS Encryption SDK — client-side envelope encryption library
- How AWS services use AWS KMS — the integration catalogue
FAQ
Deeper reading
- AWS KMS Best Practices — least-privilege key policies and rotation guidance
12.2 KMS key policies, grants, and CloudHSM ★★★ Core
Every KMS key has exactly one key policy, and unlike other resource policies it is mandatory: IAM policies grant nothing on a key unless the key policy enables IAM. Know the default key policy, separating key administrators from key users, grants for temporary programmatic delegation, the kms:ViaService and kms:EncryptionContext conditions, and cross-account key use (key policy allows the external account; that account's IAM policies allow its principals). CloudHSM is the answer when requirements say single-tenant hardware, FIPS 140-2 Level 3, or full key custody — combine with KMS via custom key stores. Expect 3-4 questions.
Core docs
- Key policies in AWS KMS — mandatory resource policy on every key
- Default key policy — administrators, users, and the IAM-enabling statement
- Grants in AWS KMS — temporary, granular permission delegation
- Allowing users in other accounts to use a KMS key — the two-sided cross-account pattern
- AWS KMS condition keys — kms:ViaService, kms:EncryptionContext, kms:CallerAccount
- What is AWS CloudHSM? — dedicated, single-tenant HSMs
- AWS KMS custom key stores — KMS API over CloudHSM-backed keys
FAQ
12.3 Amazon S3 data protection ★★★ Core
Know the encryption menu cold: SSE-S3 (default), SSE-KMS (auditable via CloudTrail, key policies apply, bucket keys cut KMS costs), DSSE-KMS, SSE-C (you supply the key per request), and client-side. Enforce with Block Public Access (account-level settings win), bucket policies denying unencrypted puts, Object Ownership disabling ACLs, versioning + MFA delete for recovery, and Object Lock for immutability. Prevent public snapshots and AMIs with the EC2 block-public-access settings. Expect 3-5 questions.
Core docs
- Protecting data with encryption — the full server-side and client-side menu
- Using SSE-KMS — key policies, CloudTrail visibility, bucket keys
- Blocking public access to your Amazon S3 storage — the four settings and their precedence
- Controlling ownership of objects and disabling ACLs — bucket owner enforced is the modern default
- Using versioning in S3 buckets — recovery from overwrite and delete; MFA delete
- Block public access for EBS snapshots — prevent public snapshots, per Skill 5.2 scenarios
FAQ
12.4 Data integrity and retention ★★ Important
Integrity controls (Skill 5.2.2): S3 Object Lock (governance can be bypassed with s3:BypassGovernanceRetention, compliance cannot — not even by root), Glacier Vault Lock for legacy vaults, versioning against overwrite, checksums/additional checksum algorithms for file validation, and AWS Signer for code signing (Lambda can enforce signed deployment packages). Lifecycle (Skill 5.2.3): S3 Lifecycle transitions and expirations, EFS lifecycle policies to IA storage, FSx for Lustre backup policies, and CloudWatch log group retention. Expect 2-3 questions.
Core docs
- Using S3 Object Lock — WORM, governance vs compliance, legal holds
- S3 Glacier Vault Lock — immutable vault policies for legacy vaults
- Checking object integrity in Amazon S3 — checksums for file validation
- What is AWS Signer? — managed code signing; Lambda signature enforcement
- Managing your storage lifecycle — transition and expiration actions
- Amazon EFS lifecycle management — automatic transition to IA storage classes
- Working with backups on FSx for Lustre — automated backup policies
12.5 Backup, replication, and ransomware protection ★★ Important
AWS Backup centralizes backup plans, retention, and cross-account/cross-Region copies across EBS, RDS, DynamoDB, EFS and more, with Backup Vault Lock providing WORM protection for recovery points — the ransomware-protection answer, because attackers who can delete your backups own you. Amazon Data Lifecycle Manager automates just EBS snapshots and AMIs; S3 replication copies objects cross-account/cross-Region; DataSync moves file data securely between on-premises and AWS. Expect 1-2 questions.
Core docs
- What is AWS Backup? — centralized, policy-based backup
- AWS Backup Vault Lock — immutable recovery points against ransomware
- Amazon Data Lifecycle Manager — scheduled EBS snapshot and AMI management
- Replicating objects — cross-account, cross-Region copies
- What is AWS DataSync? — encrypted data transfer between on-premises and AWS
FAQ
12.6 Encryption across the data stores ★★ Important
Service-specific facts the exam tests: EBS encryption is transparent, can be defaulted per Region (encryption by default), and unencrypted volumes cannot be encrypted in place — snapshot, copy-with-encryption, restore. RDS encryption must be set at creation (else snapshot-copy-restore), and read replicas inherit it. DynamoDB is always encrypted at rest (choose AWS owned, AWS managed, or customer managed key). SQS supports SSE-KMS and SSE-SQS; producers need kms:GenerateDataKey on the key. EFS encrypts at file system creation. Expect 2-3 questions.
Core docs
- Amazon EBS encryption — default encryption; snapshot-copy path for existing volumes
- Encrypting Amazon RDS resources — set at creation; encrypted snapshot workflows
- DynamoDB encryption at rest — always on; choose the key type
- Encryption at rest in Amazon SQS — SSE-KMS with key policy implications for producers
- Encrypting data at rest — Amazon EFS — enable at file system creation
FAQ
Chapter 13 — Credentials, secrets, and key material
Maps to Task 5.3 — Design and implement controls to protect confidential data, credentials, secrets, and cryptographic key materials
Skills:
- Skill 5.3.1: Design management and rotation of credentials and secrets (for example, AWS Secrets Manager).
- Skill 5.3.2: Manage and use imported key material (for example, by managing and rotating imported key material, by managing and configuring external key stores).
- Skill 5.3.3: Describe the differences between imported key material and AWS generated key material.
- Skill 5.3.4: Mask sensitive data (for example, CloudWatch Logs data protection policies, Amazon Simple Notification Service [Amazon SNS] message data protection).
- Skill 5.3.5: Create and manage encryption keys and certificates across a single AWS Region or multiple Regions (for example, AWS KMS customer managed AWS KMS keys, AWS Private Certificate Authority).
13.1 AWS Secrets Manager ★★★ Core
Secrets Manager is the answer for anything that must rotate: managed rotation for RDS/Redshift/DocumentDB credentials, Lambda-based rotation for everything else, cross-account access via resource policies, KMS encryption of every secret, and replication to other Regions. Versus Parameter Store: rotation and cross-account resource policies are the Secrets Manager differentiators; cost and simple config storage are Parameter Store's (SecureString is KMS-encrypted, but no native rotation). Expect 2-3 questions.
Core docs
- What is AWS Secrets Manager? — lifecycle-managed secrets
- Rotate AWS Secrets Manager secrets — managed vs custom Lambda rotation
- Permissions for AWS Secrets Manager — identity and resource policies together
- Secret encryption and decryption — KMS key choice and cross-account implications
- Replicate secrets across Regions — multi-Region secret copies
- AWS Systems Manager Parameter Store — the comparison point: SecureString, no rotation
- Passing sensitive data to a container — secrets reach workloads by reference, never baked in
FAQ
13.2 Imported key material and external key stores ★★ Important
Skills 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 are about key custody. AWS-generated key material: KMS creates and holds it, automatic rotation available, no expiry. Imported key material (BYOK): you generate it, wrap it, and upload — no automatic rotation (re-import under a new key and repoint the alias), you can set expiry or delete the material on demand (instant unusability), and you must keep a copy because AWS cannot recover it. External key stores (XKS) go further: the keys stay in your external HSM and KMS proxies every operation to it. Expect 1-2 questions on these distinctions.
Core docs
- Importing key material in AWS KMS — BYOK, expiration, and deletion of material
- External key stores — keys held outside AWS, proxied by KMS
- Rotating AWS KMS keys — automatic vs manual rotation semantics
- Deleting AWS KMS keys — the 7–30 day waiting period and why it exists
- Using aliases — the indirection that makes manual rotation workable
13.3 Multi-Region keys and AWS Private CA ★★ Important
Skill 5.3.5 covers cryptography across Regions: KMS multi-Region keys are related keys with the same key material and key ID suffix, replicated so each Region encrypts/decrypts locally (per-Region key policies still apply) — the answer for cross-Region DR of encrypted data without re-encryption. AWS Private CA issues private certificates for internal TLS and mutual TLS, integrates with ACM for issuance, and supports a CA hierarchy; contrast with public ACM certificates. Expect 1-2 questions.
Core docs
- Multi-Region keys in AWS KMS — related keys, same key material, per-Region policies
- What is AWS Private CA? — private certificate hierarchies
- Importing certificates into ACM — third-party certs; you own renewal
- Replicate secrets across Regions — the secrets side of multi-Region crypto
13.4 Masking sensitive data ★★ Important
New for C03 (Skill 5.3.4). CloudWatch Logs data protection policies detect and mask sensitive data (credit cards, keys, PII) in log events as they are ingested — masked for everyone except principals granted logs:Unmask. SNS message data protection does the same for messages in transit through a topic: audit, de-identify (mask/redact), or deny delivery based on data identifiers. Macie remains the at-rest discovery tool for S3. Expect 1-2 questions matching the masking tool to the data path.
Core docs
- Help protect sensitive log data with masking — CloudWatch Logs data protection policies
- Amazon SNS message data protection — audit, mask, redact, or block sensitive payloads
- What is Amazon Macie? — at-rest sensitive data discovery in S3
Part VI — Domain 6: Security Foundations and Governance (14%)
Multi-account architecture, guardrails, and compliance evidence. The question style shifts here from "fix this resource" to "enforce this across 200 accounts, automatically, forever". C03 adds resource control policies (RCPs), declarative policies, and centralized root access to the toolkit.
Chapter 14 — Multi-account strategy
Maps to Task 6.1 — Develop a strategy to centrally deploy and manage AWS accounts
Skills:
- Skill 6.1.1: Deploy and configure organizations by using AWS Organizations.
- Skill 6.1.2: Implement and manage AWS Control Tower in new and existing environments, and deploy optional and custom controls.
- Skill 6.1.3: Implement organization policies to manage permissions (for example, SCPs, RCPs, AI service opt-out policies, declarative policies).
- Skill 6.1.4: Centrally manage security services (for example, delegated administrator accounts).
- Skill 6.1.5: Manage AWS account root user credentials (for example, by centralizing root access for member accounts, managing MFA, designing break-glass procedures).
14.1 AWS Organizations, SCPs, and RCPs ★★★ Core
SCPs are guardrails on principals in member accounts: they cap maximum permissions (including each member account's root user) but never grant, and they do not affect the management account or service-linked roles. RCPs — new in C03 — are the resource-side twin: organization-wide caps on what resource-based policies can allow (for example, deny S3 access from outside the org regardless of any bucket policy). Also know AI service opt-out policies (stop AWS AI services using your content for improvement) and declarative policies (enforce service baselines like EBS snapshot block-public-access at the org level). Deny-list vs allow-list SCP strategies, OU inheritance, and the canonical deny patterns are guaranteed material. Expect 3-4 questions.
Core docs
- What is AWS Organizations? — accounts, OUs, policies
- Service control policies (SCPs) — how guardrails combine with IAM
- Resource control policies (RCPs) — org-wide caps on resource-based policies
- SCP evaluation — inheritance down the OU tree
- SCP examples — the deny patterns the exam reuses
- AI services opt-out policies — organization-wide AI data-use control
- Declarative policies — enforce service configuration baselines
- Best practices for the management account — keep workloads (and most humans) out of it
FAQ
Deeper reading
- Organizing Your AWS Environment Using Multiple Accounts — the OU structure behind the scenarios
14.2 AWS Control Tower ★★ Important
Control Tower is the managed landing zone: it sets up Organizations, log archive and audit accounts, Account Factory for provisioning, and controls — preventive (SCP-implemented), detective (Config-implemented), and proactive (CloudFormation-hook-implemented). Know mandatory vs strongly recommended vs elective controls, custom controls, drift detection for manual changes, and enrolling existing organizations (Skill 6.1.2 says "new and existing environments" — conflicting Config recorders and CloudTrail setups are the classic obstacle). Expect 1-2 questions.
Core docs
- What is AWS Control Tower? — landing zone orchestration
- Controls in AWS Control Tower — preventive, detective, proactive
- Govern existing accounts and OUs — enrolling existing organizations and the prerequisites
- Account Factory — standardized account vending
FAQ
14.3 Delegated administration and centralized security ★★ Important
The reference pattern: a dedicated security tooling account is the delegated administrator for GuardDuty, Security Hub, Macie, Inspector, Detective, Config, and Firewall Manager; findings aggregate there (plus cross-Region aggregation in Security Hub and Config aggregators for configuration data); logs centralize in a separate log archive account. Delegated administration keeps day-to-day security operations out of the management account. Expect 1-2 questions.
Core docs
- AWS services that you can use with Organizations — trusted access and delegated administration per service
- GuardDuty and AWS Organizations — auto-enable for all accounts via delegated admin
- Security Hub administrator accounts — organization-wide finding aggregation
- Multi-account multi-Region data aggregation with AWS Config — aggregators and authorizations
Deeper reading
- AWS Security Reference Architecture — which service lives in which account
14.4 Root user management ★★ Important
Skill 6.1.5 got a dedicated upgrade in C03. Know root user best practices (no access keys, hardware MFA, use only for root-only tasks), centralized root access — an IAM/Organizations capability that removes root credentials from member accounts entirely and lets the management account perform the few privileged root actions centrally — and break-glass design: a pre-provisioned emergency role or account with monitored, alarmed usage (CloudTrail metric filter on root or break-glass activity). Expect 1-2 questions.
Core docs
- Root user best practices — protect and barely use the root user
- Centralize root access for member accounts — remove member-account root credentials
- Tasks that require root user credentials — the short list of root-only actions
- Best practices for the management account — organizational root hygiene
Chapter 15 — Secure and consistent deployment
Maps to Task 6.2 — Implement a secure and consistent deployment strategy for cloud resources
Skills:
- Skill 6.2.1: Use infrastructure as code (IaC) to deploy cloud resources consistently and securely across accounts (for example, CloudFormation stack sets, third-party IaC tools, CloudFormation Guard, cfn-lint).
- Skill 6.2.2: Use tags to organize AWS resources into groups for management (for example, by grouping by department, cost center, environment).
- Skill 6.2.3: Deploy and enforce policies and configurations from a central source (for example, AWS Firewall Manager).
- Skill 6.2.4: Securely share resources across AWS accounts (for example, AWS Service Catalog, AWS Resource Access Manager [AWS RAM]).
15.1 CloudFormation security and IaC validation ★★ Important
Security-flavoured CloudFormation: StackSets for multi-account rollout, drift detection for console changes that diverged from the template, stack policies to protect resources during updates, service roles so users deploy with the role's permissions instead of their own, and dynamic references to pull secrets from Secrets Manager/Parameter Store instead of hardcoding. Pre-deployment validation is the C03 twist: cfn-lint checks template syntax and best practices; CloudFormation Guard evaluates policy-as-code rules ("no security group open to the world") before anything deploys. Expect 1-2 questions.
Core docs
- What is AWS CloudFormation? — declarative infrastructure as code
- Working with StackSets — deploy to many accounts and Regions
- Detecting unmanaged configuration changes (drift) — compare live state to template
- AWS CloudFormation service roles — deploy-time permissions separation
- Prevent updates to stack resources (stack policies) — guard critical resources during updates
- Using dynamic references to specify template values — resolve secrets at deploy time
- What is AWS CloudFormation Guard? — policy-as-code validation before deployment
- cfn-lint (GitHub) — template linting in the pipeline
FAQ
15.2 Central policy enforcement with Firewall Manager ★★ Important
Firewall Manager centrally deploys and enforces WAF web ACLs, Shield Advanced protections, security groups, Network Firewall, and DNS Firewall policies across all accounts in an organization — including resources created in the future. Prerequisites the exam loves: AWS Organizations with all features, a designated administrator account, and AWS Config enabled. "New accounts must automatically get the WAF rules" is the Firewall Manager trigger phrase. Expect 1-2 questions.
Core docs
- What is AWS Firewall Manager? — centralized firewall policy management
- AWS Firewall Manager prerequisites — Organizations, admin account, AWS Config
- Firewall Manager policies — WAF, Shield Advanced, security group, Network Firewall, DNS Firewall
FAQ
15.3 Service Catalog, RAM, and tagging ★ Light
One-line distinctions: Service Catalog lets end users launch pre-approved, pre-hardened products without holding the underlying permissions (launch constraints use a role); AWS RAM shares resources (subnets, TGWs, Route 53 rules) across accounts without duplicating them; tag policies in Organizations standardize tag keys/values; resource groups collect resources by tag for management by department, cost center, or environment. Expect 1-2 quick questions.
Core docs
- What is Service Catalog? — curated portfolios of approved products
- Service Catalog launch constraints — provision with a role, not user permissions
- What is AWS Resource Access Manager? — cross-account resource sharing
- Tag policies in AWS Organizations — enforce tagging standards
- What are resource groups? — tag-based grouping for management
Deeper reading
- Best Practices for Tagging AWS Resources — the tagging strategy whitepaper
Chapter 16 — Compliance evaluation
Maps to Task 6.3 — Evaluate the compliance of AWS resources
Skills:
- Skill 6.3.1: Create or enable rules to detect and remediate noncompliant AWS resources and to send notifications (for example, by using AWS Config to aggregate alerts and remediate non-compliant resources, Security Hub).
- Skill 6.3.2: Use AWS audit services to collect and organize evidence (for example, AWS Audit Manager, AWS Artifact).
- Skill 6.3.3: Use AWS services to evaluate architecture for compliance with AWS security best practices (for example, AWS Well-Architected Framework tool).
16.1 AWS Config ★★★ Core
Config records resource configuration history and evaluates it against rules (managed or custom Lambda/Guard), with optional automatic remediation through SSM Automation and notifications through EventBridge/SNS. Know the trigger types (configuration change vs periodic), conformance packs for rule bundles, aggregators for org-wide views, and the split the exam loves: Config answers "is this resource configured correctly and who changed it", CloudTrail answers "who called what API", GuardDuty answers "is something attacking us". Expect 3-4 questions.
Core docs
- What is AWS Config? — configuration recorder and timeline
- Evaluating resources with AWS Config rules — managed and custom rules, trigger types
- List of AWS Config managed rules — the rule names that appear verbatim in answers
- Remediating noncompliant resources — SSM Automation remediation actions
- Conformance packs — deployable compliance packs, org-wide
- Multi-account multi-Region data aggregation — the aggregator view
FAQ
16.2 Audit Manager and AWS Artifact ★ Light
Two easily confused services: AWS Artifact is where you download AWS's own compliance reports (SOC, PCI, ISO) and sign agreements — evidence about AWS. Audit Manager continuously collects evidence about your usage against frameworks (CIS, PCI DSS, custom) into assessment reports — evidence about you. Security Hub findings and Config snapshots feed Audit Manager assessments. One distinguishing question.
Core docs
- What is AWS Audit Manager? — automated evidence collection against frameworks
- What is AWS Artifact? — AWS compliance reports on demand
16.3 Well-Architected reviews and Trusted Advisor ★★ Important
The Well-Architected Tool runs structured reviews of workloads against the framework pillars and surfaces high-risk issues — Skill 6.3.3's "evaluate architecture for compliance with best practices". Trusted Advisor's security checks (public snapshots, open security groups, IAM use, MFA on root, S3 bucket permissions) are the quick wins; full checks need Business/Enterprise Support. Both surface findings toward remediation rather than performing it. Expect 1-2 questions.
Core docs
- AWS Well-Architected Framework — the six pillars
- Security Pillar — design principles quoted throughout the exam
- What is the AWS Well-Architected Tool? — workload reviews and risk tracking
- AWS Trusted Advisor — check categories and support-plan tiers
Final checklist
Before you book the exam, you should be able to answer these without looking anything up:
- Walk the IAM policy evaluation flow, including where SCPs, RCPs, permissions boundaries, session policies, and resource policies each intervene — and what changes across account boundaries.
- Explain why a KMS key policy is different from every other resource policy in AWS, design one that separates key administrators from key users, and state the custody differences between AWS-generated key material, imported key material, and an external key store.
- Sequence the containment of a compromised EC2 instance and a compromised access key without destroying evidence — the ordering question type will make you prove it.
- Name the data source and the analysis tool for any given question: who called the API (CloudTrail), what the network did (VPC and transit gateway flow logs), what DNS resolved (Resolver logs), what the config was (AWS Config), what threat is active (GuardDuty), and where it all normalizes (Security Lake, in OCSF).
- Choose between SSE-S3, SSE-KMS, SSE-C, and client-side encryption from a one-line business requirement, and enforce the choice with a bucket policy.
- Draw the multi-account reference architecture: management account, security tooling account with delegated administration, log archive account, and the SCPs and RCPs that hold it together.
- Say what Bedrock Guardrails, CloudWatch Logs data protection policies, and Verified Access each protect — the three newest additions are the easiest points on the paper if you know the one-liners.
If those feel comfortable, do the official practice question set on Skill Builder, review whatever domains come back weakest, and book it. Good luck.